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Abstract
This paper analyses the effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions in Croa-
tia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Turkey using the event
study approach. Interventions are found to be effective only in the short run when
they ease appreciation pressures. Central bank communication and interest rate steps
considerably enhance their effectiveness. The observed effect of interventions on the
exchange rate corresponds to the declared objectives of the central banks of Croatia,
the Czech Republic, Hungary and perhaps also Romania, whereas this is only par-
tially true for Slovakia and Turkey. Finally, interventions are mostly sterilized in all
countries except Croatia. Interventions are not much more effective in Croatia than
in the other countries studied. This suggests that unsterilized interventions do not
automatically in￿uence the exchange rate.
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11 Introduction
The empirical literature on the effectiveness of ￿ mostly sterilized ￿ foreign exchange (FX) in-
terventions in developed market economies remains fairly mixed despite the recent emergence of
some more supportive evidence.
1 In this context, Canales-Kirjenko (2003) argues that foreign ex-
change interventions may be more effective in emerging market economies than in well-established
industrialized countries, because (1) central bank interventions are not always fully sterilized, (2)
the size of interventions is large relative to market turnover in narrow foreign exchange markets,
(3) the market organization and the regulatory framework may be more conducive to interventions
or (4) moral suasion may play a bigger role.
Nonetheless, there is little empirical evidence with regard to the proposition that central bank
interventionsmightbemoreeffectiveinemergingmarketeconomies. Thisisalsotrueforemerging
European market economies, even though the number of country-speci￿c studies has been on the
rise recently.
2 Against this backdrop, we add to the literature by scrutinizing the impact of daily
FX interventions on the exchange rate in a large number of emerging European countries ￿ Croatia,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Turkey ￿ for episodes of ￿exible exchange
rate policies. In this endeavor, we have recourse to the event study approach, which is claimed to
be superior to econometric analysis if interventions take place only sporadically (Fatum, 2002, and
Fatum and Hutchison, 2003).
In addition to the broad country coverage, our contribution to the literature is threefold. First,
we scrutinize the role of central bank communication and interest rate news and study how they can
1 For a survey, see e.g. Sarno and Taylor (2001).
2 Turkey and the Czech Republic are the two countries for which daily FX interventions are analyzed most ex-
tensively. For Turkey, see Domac and Mendoza (2004), Guiamaraes and Karacadog (2004) and Akinci et al. (2005a,b).
For the Czech Republic, examples are Disyatat and Galati (2005), ￿gert and KomÆrek (2006) for daily data and Ger￿l
and Holub (2006) for monthly and daily data. Scalia (2006) matches daily intervention data with intraday ko-
runa/euro data. Gereben, Gyomai and Kiss (2006) study FX interventions in a FX microstructure (order ￿ow)
setup for Hungary. While not directly linked to the issue of the effectiveness of FX interventions, it is worth not-
ing that Radulescu (2004) and Chmelarova and Schnabl (2006) estimate reaction functions of central bank inter-
ventions for Romania and Croatia, respectively.
2reinforce the effect of actual interventions. Second, we do not only analyze the effectiveness of FX
interventions, but also attempt to clarify whether actual interventions are fully, partially or not at all
sterilized. This is crucial, given that unsterilized interventions are thought to be more effective than
sterilized interventions. We also discuss under what conditions unsterilized interventions are more
effective than sterilized ones. Finally, the success of central bank interventions is interpreted not
only in terms of the statistical success criteria but also in the light of the of￿cially stated objectives
of FX interventions.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 brie￿y sketches the role and
stated objectives of FX interventions in the countries under review. Section 3 discusses the event
study approach, while section 4 describes the dataset and section 5 presents the results. Section
6 analyzes whether FX interventions are fully sterilized. Section 7 ￿nally gives some concluding
remarks.
2 Foreign Exchange Interventions in Emerging European Countries
2.1 Exchange Rate Regimes and Foreign Exchange Interventions
Generally speaking, monetary policy in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe
relied on the exchange rate as an intermediate target to achieve price stability in the early stages of
the transition process. The exchange rate was considered the most effective channel of monetary
policy, as the monetization of the economy was relatively low, which implied that the interest rate
channel and the credit channel were not considered particularly effective. Hence, stable nominal
exchange rates anchored domestic in￿ation by keeping the price of imported tradable goods stable.
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, stable exchange rates provide a nominal anchor for
in￿ationary expectations both in the tradable and the nontradable sectors.
At a later stage of transition, the countries under review took different approaches with regard
to the exchange rate regime, although there seems to be a general move toward more exchange
rate ￿exibility (see Table 1). Five out of the six surveyed countries currently operate managed ￿oat
3regimes. While de facto exchange rate ￿exibility is highest in the Czech Republic, it is lowest
in Croatia. In fact, the exchange rate ￿uctuations observed in Croatia are comparable to that in
Hungary, where a ￿xed regime with a wide band is in place.
Pegged regimes were mostly maintained by restrictions on capital movements and less by ex-
change rate interventions on the rather illiquid FX markets. However, restrictions on capital move-
ments were gradually levied from 1994 onward, because the countries wished to join the OECD
and the European Union and because of IMF recommendations. As a matter of fact, one important
reason for the shift toward more exchange rate ￿exibility was capital account liberalization, fol-
lowed eventually by considerable cross border capital in- and out￿ows. Some countries frequently
used ￿ and still use ￿ FX interventions to achieve the central banks’ policy objectives, which we
will outline in greater detail below.
Table 1. Exchange rate regimes in transition economies and in Turkey, 1990￿2006.
’90 ’91 ’92 ’93 ’94 ’95 ’96 ’97 ’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 ’05 ’06
Croatia 1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Czech Rep. 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5-6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Hungary 1 1 1 1 1 1-2 2 2 2 2 2 2-4-5 5 5 5 5 5
Romania 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3-6 6 6
Slovakia 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5-6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Turkey 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 6 6 6 6 6 6
1: peg to a currency or to a basket with ￿uctuation margins less than or equal to￿2.25%
2: crawling peg with ￿uctuation margins of less than or equal to￿2.25%
3: ￿oat with active management by monetary authorities (implicit crawling peg)
4: crawling peg with ￿uctuation margins of more than￿2.25%
5: peg to a currency or a basket with ￿uctuation margins of more than￿2.25%
6: ￿oat with intervention
2.2 Of￿cial Objectives and Instruments of FX Interventions
This section presents the of￿cially announced objectives and the instruments of FX interventions,
which we extracted from various central bank publications (see Appendix A for the sources). Let
us start with Croatia: The Croatian National Bank (HNB) has been regularly intervening on the
4FX market since 1994 by means of FX auctions, with the objective to stabilize the kuna against the
euro (German mark prior to 1998) in a band of ￿2%.
After the 1997 crisis, the Czech National Bank intervened directly on the interbank FX market
in both directions in order to stabilize the exchange rate against the German mark and announced a
target band of 17￿19.5 CZK/DEM (33.5￿38.5 CZK/EUR). Since the introduction of direct in￿ation
targeting in 1998, interventions aimed to slow down the nominal currency appreciation. They were
justi￿ed to avoid major deviations of the exchange rate from its fundamentals. No interventions
took place between 2003 and mid-2006.
Since the enlargement of the bands to ￿15% in May 2001, the Hungarian central bank inter-
vened twice, on January 15 and 16, 2003, with the deliberate aim of preventing the forint from
appreciating beyond the stronger edge of the band.
3 The central bank was present on several other
occasions on the FX market, not because it intended to in￿uence the exchange rate, but for the
purposes of buying foreign currency on behalf of the government to service FX denominated pub-
lic debt and because it was selling off the FX reserves accumulated after the markets had calmed
down following the speculative run on January 15￿16, 2003.
In Romania, frequent interventions were replaced by punctual interventions following the move
to adopt a managed ￿oat in November 2004. The National Bank of Romania conducted FX in-
terventions to prevent an excessive appreciation of the domestic currency on the one hand, and to
build up foreign exchange reserves on the other.
During the years following the move to adopt a managed ￿oat, the Slovak central bank’s FX
interventions aimed to achieve two goals: to diminish the excessive volatility of the Slovak ko-
runa’s exchange rate against the German mark (and against the euro after 1999), and to counteract
appreciation pressures from 2002 onward.
According to the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT), foreign exchange inter-
ventions are not intended to target any precise exchange rate level, but aim to dampen excessive
3 See ￿rsek (2005) for a case study of the speculative attack against the forint.
5volatility instead and to increase international reserves. When considering exchange rate volatility,
the central bank not only looks at past and present volatilities, but also considers changes in volatil-
ity that are expected to occur in the future (CBRT, 2004, paragraph 26). FX interventions by the
Turkish central bank can take the form of discretionary interventions carried out on the FX market,
which are made public some time after the interventions took place, or with commercial banks and
pre-announced FX auctions. The declared goal of the FX auctions was changed over time, as they
are not intended to decrease FX volatility, but rather to build up FX reserves in accordance with the
monetary policy framework (international reserves are an intermediate target) without in￿uencing
the exchange rate.
4
Table 2. Of￿cially announced objectives of central bank interventions
Year Objective
Croatia 1994 ￿ mid-2006 Stabilizing the kuna in a band of about￿2% within a managed ￿oat.
Czech Rep.
1997 ￿ 1998
1999 ￿ 2002
2003 ￿ mid-2006
Stabilizing the koruna vis-￿-vis the German mark after the koruna crisis
Smoothing the trend appreciation of the exchange rate
No FX interventions
Hungary 2003 Interventions at the stronger margin to defend the exchange rate regime
Romania 11/2004 ￿
Building up FX reserves
Counteracting appreciation pressures of the Romanian leu
Slovakia
1998 ￿ 2005
2002 ￿ 2005
Decreasing excessive exchange rate volatility
Counteracting appreciation pressures on the Slovak koruna
Turkey 2001 ￿ mid-2006
Preventing excessive exchange rate volatility (discretionary interventions)
Building up FX reserves (pre-announced FX auctions)
4 However, reading between the lines suggests that decreasing excessive exchange rate volatility is perhaps not
the key goal of the central bank and that it might actually consider altering the trend of the exchange rate. According to
CBRT (2002, p. 74), ￿foreign exchange auctions were temporarily suspended as of July due to the volatilities of
exchange rates￿, which is in contradiction to the declared intention of counteracting excessive volatility. It is also
mentioned several times that the central bank considers excessive volatility in both directions. This may indicate
that the CBRT also looks at changes in the exchange rate, given that volatility is an absolute measure.
6Table 3. Types of FX interventions
Instruments Announcement
Croatia FX auctions On the morning prior to the auction
Czech Rep. Direct intervention on the FX market After the intervention; with a delay of some months
Hungary Direct interventions on the FX market After the intervention; in central bank publications
Romania Direct interventions on the FX market
After the intervention, until early 2005 in
monthly bulletins, since then no of￿cial publication
Slovakia Direct interventions on the FX market After the interventions; one month later
Turkey
Direct interventions on the FX market
Pre-announced FX auctions
Direct interventions: published 3 months later
Pre-announced FX auctions: announced some days earlier
2.3 Off-Market Interventions
A number of central banks resorted to off-market FX operations. These preventive actions aimed to
avoid that the conversion of large privatization revenues to the domestic currency takes place on the
foreign exchange market by putting appreciation pressure on the national currency. Therefore, cen-
tral banks converted privatization revenues and deposited them in domestic currency on a special
account at the central bank held usually by the Ministry of Finance or the privatization authority,
e.g. in Croatia (privatization of Croatian Telecom in 2001 and INA, a Croatian oil company, in
2003), in the Czech Republic in 2000 and 2002 and, more recently, in Slovakia.
3 The Effectiveness of FX Interventions: An Event Study Approach
3.1 Methodological Issues
If foreign exchange interventions occur rarely or only after a large number of days without inter-
vention, standard time series econometric techniques are likely to ￿nd that of￿cial interventions do
not have an effect on exchange rates, with the latter being highly volatile in the short run (Fatum,
2002; Fatum and Hutchinson, 2003). A big advantage of the event study approach over time series
techniques is that it only looks at periods when interventions take place, and is thus able to ￿lter out
longer periods during which no interventions happen and which might cause econometric studies
to ￿nd no relation between foreign exchange interventions and exchange rate behavior.
7From our group of six countries, the literature covers mostly only the Czech Republic and
Turkey, and a majority of the papers use econometric estimations. Only Akinci et al. (2005b)
and Ger￿l and Holub (2006) employ the event study approach for Turkey and the Czech Republic,
using daily and monthly data, respectively.
5
When applying the event study approach, we have to address the following three issues: the
de￿nition of a single intervention episode or event, its effectiveness and the time horizon analyzed
before and after the intervention event.
3.1.1 The de￿nition of a single intervention episode or event
The key question in this context is how many days between two single intervention acts going in
the same direction (both purchases or both sales) qualify them as two distinct intervention events.
6
In this study, we considered the following ￿ve alternative de￿nitions of an intervention event:
the number of consecutive days without intervention activity between single interventions in one
direction can be up to 2, 5, 10, 20 and 30. An intervention event ends if more than 2, 5, 10, 20 or
30 days go by without an intervention or if the intervention is in the opposite direction.
7
3.1.2 The effectiveness of an intervention event
The following two classes of effective interventions can be distinguished.
Leaning against the wind (breaking/reversing the trend): central bank intervention reverses the
trend of the exchange rate, i.e. the exchange rate depreciates (appreciates) in the pre-event window,
and appreciates (depreciates) in the post-event window following domestic currency purchases
(sales).
5 For Turkey, Domac and Mendoza (2004) use daily data from February 2001 to May 2002 and rely on an EGARCH
model. Guimaraes and Karacadag (2004) apply the component GARCH model for a two-year period running from
March 2001 to October 2003. Using a very similar period (March 2001 to May 2003), Akinci et al. (2005a) carry
out time-varying estimations, and Akinci et al. (2005b) use a simple GARCH model. For the Czech Republic,
Disyatat and Galati (2005) report estimation results of an instrumental variable approach for the period 2001 to 2002.
6 For a discussion, see Fatum (2000).
7 Fatum (2000) and Fatum and Hutchison (2003) use up to 15 days, while Cashin et al. (2006) use up to 10 days with
no intervention between two consecutive interventions within a single event.
8Buying domestic currency: (It < 0, ￿et￿ > 0 and ￿et+ < 0)
Selling domestic currency: (It > 0, ￿et￿ < 0 and ￿et+ > 0)
Where It < 0 (It > 0 ) stands for domestic currency purchases (sales), ￿et￿(￿et+) is the
change in the exchange rate in the pre-event window (post-event window).
8
Smoothing exchange rate movements: the central bank slows down the appreciation or the de-
preciation of the domestic currency, i.e. domestic currency purchases (sales) cause the exchange
rate to depreciate (appreciate) less in the post-event window than in the pre-event window.
9
Domestic currency purchases: (It < 0, ￿et￿ > 0; ￿et+ > 0 and ￿et+ < ￿et￿)
Domestic currency sales: (It > 0, ￿et￿ < 0; ￿et+ < 0 and ￿et+ > ￿et￿).
3.1.3 The time horizon analyzed before and after the intervention event
As to the size of the pre- and post-event windows, we look at nine different lengths: 1, 2, 5, 10,
15, 20, 30, 40 and 60 days. The pre- and post-event windows are constructed in a symmetric way,
implying that 2-day (5-day etc.) pre-event windows are compared to 2-day (5-day etc.) post-event
windows.
10 In addition, effectiveness is also analyzed for the event window itself, if the event
window’s size is larger than two days using a pre-event window of two days.
It is important to look at pre- and post-event windows that do not overlap with other interven-
tions events, as the latter could modify the effect of the intervention event under consideration.
8 The exchange rate is expressed as domestic currency units over one unit of foreign currency. Hence, an increase
(decrease) denotes depreciation (appreciation).
9 A third variant would be ￿leaning with the wind￿, if the central bank accentuates market trends (increasing the
pace of appreciation/depreciation). However, in view of the of￿cial goals of FX interventions of the countries under
study, leaning with the wind can be regarded as a failure rather than a success. Note that the literature (e.g. Fatum, 2000
and Fratzscher, 2005) also uses the event criterion and the direction criterion, which analyze whether the exchange rate
moves in the desired direction in the event window (event criterion) or after the event (direction criterion). However,
these two criteria are not very meaningful, given that the development of the exchange rate prior to the intervention
event is not considered. In addition, our de￿nition of exchange rate smoothing is stricter than the one used in the
literature. Our de￿nition of exchange rate smoothing implies that interventions slow down the pace of depreciation or
appreciation, but do not reverse the trend, while exchange rate smoothing as it is generally de￿ned in the literature
encompasses ￿ somewhat confusingly ￿ both exchange rate smoothing and leaning against the wind as de￿ned in
our paper.
10 Fatum (2000) employs 2-, 5-, 10-, and 15-day window sizes, while Cashin et al. (2006) looks at 2-day and
21-day windows. Cashin and others term the 2-day window short-term and the 21-day window long-term windows.
9Finally, we analyze not only changes in the exchange rate, but also focus on changes in the
volatility of the exchange rate. For this purpose, we compare the volatility measures over the
(symmetric) pre- and post-event windows, but ignore pre- and post-event windows of one and two
days as standard deviations; our measure of volatility cannot be meaningfully computed for such
short periods.
3.2 Statistical Test of Effectiveness
Effectivenessofindividualinterventioneventscanbestatisticallyanalyzedusingthenon-parametric
sign test, which has been frequently used in event studies (MacKinley, 1997, p. 32) and in the liter-
ature on FX interventions of recent years (Humpage, 1999; Fatum, 2002, 2005; Fatum and Hutchi-
son, 2003; and Fratzscher, 2005). The test statistic is constructed as follows: S = (N+
N ￿ ￿)
p
N+
N ,
where N+ is the number of successful events, is the total number of events analyzed, ￿ is a proba-
bilityparameterandS ￿ N(0;1). Thereisindeedaprobabilityof50%(￿ = 0:5)thattheexchange
rate will appreciate (depreciate) in the period t+1 as compared to a depreciation (appreciation) in
period t. Hence, the non-parametric sign test investigates whether the number of leaning-against-
the-wind type of successes is signi￿cantly larger than 50%. In other words, the sign test examines
whether the null hypothesis of a random change in the exchange rate can be rejected against the
alternative of a systematic change (due to FX interventions in our case). In a similar vein, the prob-
ability of the exchange rate depreciating (appreciating) less but not switching to an appreciation
(depreciation) in the case of exchange rate smoothing is 25% (￿ = 0:25 ).
11;12
3.3 The Key Interest Rate and Verbal Interventions
An interesting question is whether changes in the exchange rate occur only as a result of FX
interventions or because other factors also interfere with the impact of FX interventions. The key
interest rate and verbal intervention by the central bank play a prominent role in this respect, as FX
11 When exchange rate smoothing is de￿ned as including leaning against the wind, the probability parameter takes the
value of 0.75 (0.5 for leaning against the wind plus 0.25 for exchange rate smoothing).
12 Note that ￿nite sample critical values are used for the nonparametric sign tests.
10interventions possibly turn out to be effective partly because they are supported by key interest rate
moves (Fatum and Hutchison, 2003) and/or by verbal interventions of the central bank (Fratzscher,
2005).
To see the extent to which key interest rate moves and verbal interventions interfere with actual
FX interventions, it is necessary to construct intervention events during which no moves in the
domestic or foreign key interest rate and verbal interventions occur. In addition, the condition
of having no overlap in the pre- and post-event windows with other intervention episodes has to
be extended in such a way that the pre-and post-event windows contain neither other intervention
episodes nor any interest rate step and verbal interventions.
It is also relevant for our purposes to disentangle the effect of pure interest rate moves (net
of actual and verbal interventions) and pure verbal interventions (net of actual interventions and
interest rate moves) on the exchange rate. Against this backdrop, we construct so-called interest
rate and verbal intervention events, using the same event and pre- and post-window de￿nitions as
for the FX intervention events. The success of the measures is evaluated as follows:
Leaning against the wind: a domestic interest rate cut (hike) or an increase (decrease) in the
foreign interest rate causes exchange rate depreciation (appreciation) instead of the appreciation
(depreciation) observed in the pre-event window. Verbal intervention is regarded as successful, if
supportive (weakening) intervention causes the exchange rate to appreciate (depreciate) following
exchange rate depreciation (appreciation) in the pre-event window.
Smoothing exchange rate movements: a domestic interest rate cut (hike) leads to less appreci-
ation (depreciation) in the post-event window than in the pre-event window. Similarly, increases
(decreases) in the foreign interest rate bring about less appreciation (depreciation) after the event.
Verbal intervention is considered successful, if supportive (weakening) intervention causes the ex-
change rate to depreciate (appreciate) less following exchange rate depreciation (appreciation).
Finally, the joint effect of actual interventions on the one hand, and interest rate moves and
verbal interventions on the other hand, obviously depends upon the coordination of the different
11policy measures. Table 4 below indicates the direction of interest rate moves and verbal interven-
tions, which are consistent with actual interventions.
Table 4. Interest rate moves and verbal interventions consistent with actual interventions
Domestic currency weakening Domestic currency strengthening
FX interventions Domestic currency sale Domestic currency purchase
Domestic interest rate Decrease Increase
Foreign interest rate Increase Decrease
Verbal intervention Weakening statement Strengthening statement
4 Sterilization of FX Interventions
It is common wisdom that non-sterilized FX interventions are effective because changes in the
liquidity of the banking sector are transmitted to money supply and the nominal exchange rate
changes owing to a shift in relative money supplies. Against this background, it is important to
explorewhetherinterventionsaresterilized inthecountriesconsidered. Ifweturn toof￿cialcentral
bank publications, they con￿rm that FX interventions are indeed sterilized in the countries under
study by means of standing facilities and/or open market operations, with a shift being observed
toward open market operations in recent years.
13 In addition, Croatia actively uses administrative
measures (including changes in the calculation base of minimum reserve and marginal reserve
ratios) to withdraw excess liquidity from the interbank money market. A number of other central
banks have been sterilizing excess liquidity resulting from the decrease of the minimum reserve
requirement ratio in the attempt to approach the level prevailing in the euro area (2% in 2006).
Nevertheless, it is very dif￿cult to determine whether FX interventions are fully or only partially
sterilized, because the sterilization of FX interventions is part of the central bank’s overall liquidity
management. In addition to monetary policy operations and changes in the reserve requirement
13 For instance, the Romanian central bank employs deposit facilities and increasingly relies on open market oper-
ations including certi￿cates of deposits and ￿xed-rate deposit auctions. The Croatian and Slovak central banks use cen-
tral bank bill auctions. In Turkey, the central bank regulates liquidity via deposit-buying auctions and via reverse re-
pos at the Istanbul Stock Exchange.
12system, the liquidity of the banking system (i.e. the current account holdings of commercial banks
at the central bank) is to a large degree in￿uenced by so-called autonomous liquidity factors, which
are not controlled by the central bank. These autonomous factors are, among others (i) money
in circulation, (ii) the redemption of maturing government securities or (iii) the issuance of new
government securities, (iv) the use of the privatization revenues deposited at the central bank,
and (v) the in- or out￿ow of foreign capital excluding FX interventions. The phenomenon of de-
dollarization, which can be observed in the Turkish economy after 2002, also plays a role in this
context.
Full sterilization by the central bank is not necessary, if changes in the autonomous factors ab-
sorb the excess liquidity created by domestic currency sales or create liquidity that is destructed
by domestic currency purchases. In this case, the central bank should take care only of the ￿re-
maining￿ excess liquidity or of the liquidity to be created. In contrast, full sterilization may be
not enough, if the evolution of autonomous factors ampli￿es the effect of FX interventions. In this
case, the central bank needs to sterilize beyond the amount of the FX intervention.
Central banks make projections or forecasts of the autonomous factors. These forecasts are es-
sentialformonetarypolicyoperationstoobtainthedesiredlevelofliquidity. However, autonomous
factors are rather volatile and admittedly dif￿cult to forecast with accuracy. Consequently, while
FX interventions can be fully sterilized (including both monetary policy operations and changes
in the autonomous factors) ex ante, the sterilization may be only partial or disproportionate ex
post to the extent that the forecasts have been imprecise. This implies that proportionate steriliza-
tion is very dif￿cult to achieve in practice. This problem is particularly relevant in transition and
emerging market economies, given the possibly large forecasting errors due to short time series
with multiple structural breaks. Furthermore, it is impossible to assess the reviewed central banks’
forecasting ability ￿ as opposed to the ECB and the Bank of Japan, they do not publish liquidity
forecasts (Bindseil, 2002), and little is known about their projection and forecasting methods.
14 To
14 Some central banks rely only on expert opinion in the management of interbank liquidity.
13this adds the high degree of uncertainty regarding the pace of, and the dif￿culty to forecast, the
de-dollarization process in Turkey.
Hence, the practical question is not whether a central bank fully sterilizes its interventions, but
rather whether it manages to absorb signi￿cant amounts of excess liquidity or compensate a fall
in liquidity caused by FX interventions. To show the extent of sterilization, we collected monthly
data on the evolution of central bank sterilization from central bank balance sheets and compared
them to the number of FX interventions.
15 Figure 1 shows that central bank interventions were
largely offset by sterilization operations in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, while ster-
ilization was only partial in Croatia, Romania and Turkey. However, as argued earlier, sterilization
operations have to be analyzed jointly with the development of the autonomous factors.
Consequently, unsterilized or only partially sterilized interventions should show up in the mon-
etary base and, most importantly, in monetary aggregates such as for example M2. In fact, the
monetary base remains stable for all countries except for Croatia and Hungary. In Hungary, there
is a spike in the monetary base despite sterilization. This is because sterilization is achieved via
standing facilities (central bank deposits), which are included in the monetary base. By contrast,
open market operations (OMOs) are not included in the monetary base. Therefore, for countries re-
lying largely on OMOs as a tool of sterilization, there is no change in the monetary base. However,
classi￿cation also matters: Even though standing facilities make up the major part of sterilization
operations in Romania, sterilization is not re￿ected in the monetary base, probably because the
monetary base excludes standing facilities (publication of the National Bank of Romania do not
provide help on this issue).
15 Daily data would be needed to see whether individual FX interventions are fully sterilized. They are available for
monetary policy operations, but not for the autonomous factors, which are crucial to assess whether FX interventions
are fully or only partially sterilized by monetary policy operations. It might also be argued that, if interventions
were fully sterilized, interest rates would remain unchanged because no changes would take place in the money supply.
By contrast, interest rates would move, if sterilization was not or only partially sterilized. However, such an approach
potentially underestimates the true number of sterilized interventions because of the time-varying risk premium. For
instance, if the central bank intervened by selling the domestic currency to counteract appreciation pressures, it could
also decrease the interest rate and at the same time sterilize the full amount of FX interventions, if the decrease
in the policy rate re￿ected a drop in the country risk premium.
14However, changes in the monetary base need not be fully re￿ected in the monetary aggregates,
given that standing facilities, a major part of the monetary base, are not included in the monetary
aggregates. Indeed, monetary aggregates remain fairly stable in the presence of FX interventions
in all countries (including Hungary) except for Croatia, where an inspection of Figure 1 below sug-
gests that M4 might be affected by FX interventions. Based on the national banks’ data presented
below, we conclude that Croatia is the only country where FX interventions have an obvious effect
on the monetary aggregates and hence are unsterilized. In the other countries reviewed, FX inter-
ventions do not have a clear effect on the monetary aggregates and are therefore probably mostly
sterilized.
16
16 The relationship between FX interventions and monetary aggregates could be analyzed in a formal way. However,
such an exercise is out of the scope of this paper.
15Figure 1. FX interventions, sterilization and monetary aggregates (in NCU millions)
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Source: Various publications of the national central banks.
Notes: The series are cumulated. FX interventions are expressed in national currency units (NCU) to render them comparable to monetary aggregates.
The amount of sterilization is given as the sum of monetary policy factors from the monetary base (taken from the asset and liability side of the central
bank’s balance sheet), i.e. the sum of central bank standing facilities and open market operations. Negative (positive) ￿gures indicate that liquidity is
taken out from (added to) the system. Data on autonomous factors, the monetary base and monetary aggregates were drawn from central bank publications.
M2 is taken as a measure of monetary aggregate. For Croatia, only M4 is available.
5 Description of the Data
The effectiveness of interventions is analyzed for the period during which the countries under study
were operating ￿exible exchange rate regimes and for which daily data are available. Our sample
starts on January 4, 1996, for Croatia, on June 1, 1997, for the Czech Republic, on April 4, 2001,
for Hungary, on November 1, 2001, for Romania, on January 4, 1999, for Slovakia and on February
22, 2001, for Turkey. The observation period ends on January 31, 2006.
Daily exchange rate data are collected vis-￿-vis the foreign currency to which the respective
country’s exchange rate policy is oriented: the euro (German mark prior to 1999) for Croatia, the
16Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia and the dollar for Turkey. The exchange rate
series are obtained from the ECB (via Datastream) for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and
Slovakia. The data source is Datastream for Turkey
17 and the Croatian National Bank for Croatia.
As the Croatian National Bank publishes exchange rate data with a delay of two days, the data
series for Croatia had to be adjusted for this two-day lag. The data retrieved from the ECB is based
on exchange rate ￿xing at 13.30, while the time of ￿xing is not known for Croatia and Turkey.
Data on daily FX interventions is obtained from the central bank for Croatia, the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary and Turkey.
18 Time series used for Slovakia and Romania are a mixture of daily and
monthly data. Monthly FX interventions reported in central bank publications are re￿ned and com-
pleted by daily FX interventions reported in Factiva.
19 Monthly interventions are treated as daily
interventions throughout the given month. It should be noted in this context that what is important
in the event study approach is not the size of the intervention, but the fact that it takes place on a
given day.
Interest rate data refer to changes in the key central bank interest rate.
20
Verbal intervention data with a daily frequency are extracted from news reports obtained from
Factiva.
21 In a ￿rst step, a search is conducted in Factiva’s archives to identify central bank state-
ments concerning the exchange rate. For each country, the search is carried out using the following
words in the following combination: ￿exchange rate￿ AND name of the national currency (e.g.
forint, koruna, kuna, leu, lira) AND (￿central bank￿ OR ￿intervention￿ OR name of the central
bank governor). Of￿cial statements by government of￿cials (including the prime minister, the
17 The following Datastream codes are used: CZECBSP for the Czech Republic, HNECBSP for Hungary, SXECBSP
for Slovakia, RMECBSP for Romania, and TKUSDSP for Turkey.
18 Diverse central bank publications downloaded from central bank websites or obtained upon request.
19 Factiva, a Dow Jones and Reuters Company, provides a collection of sources on business news and information.
It includes, among others, Dow Jones and Reuters newswires.
20 Czech Republic: two-week REPO rate; Hungary: two-week deposit rates at the central bank; Romania: open
markets operations reference rate; Slovakia: discount rate until end-2001, two-week REPO tender rate after January
1, 2002; Turkey: one-week borrowing facility; ECB: re￿nancing rate: ￿xed rate tender rate until June 27, 2000,
and variable rate tender rate after June 28, 2000; US: federal funds rate. Note that for Turkey, data on policy rates
start on April 25, 2003.
21 See Fratzscher (2005) for a discussion on the use of verbal intervention data collected from newswires.
17minister of ￿nance or any other minister) are purposefully omitted, given that decisions with re-
gard to FX intervention and to interest rate moves are the exclusive domain of the central banks
in the countries under study. Subsequently, the central bank statements need to be classi￿ed as to
whether they aim at strengthening or weakening the currency. Since this classi￿cation of central
bank statements to some extent also depends on subjective perception, those statements which are
not very clear with regard to their intention (to support or undermine the national currency) are
eliminated. Only statements with a rather straightforward message are used. Finally, it should be
mentioned that news reported after 13.30 are assigned to the next day, given that the exchange rate
data is based on a ￿xing at 13.30.
Figure 2. Actual and verbal interventions, interest rate moves and the exchange rate
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Note: The right-hand scale denotes the exchange rate. Negative (positive) ￿gures refer to interventions and interest rate moves,
which strengthen (weaken) the domestic currency.
186 Results
6.1 Net Effect of FX Interventions ￿ Overall Impact
The ￿rst step of our analysis is to look at the effect of actual interventions on the exchange rate.
To obtain the net effect of actual interventions, we have to ascertain that overlaps with verbal
interventions and interest news are ￿ltered out. Therefore, intervention events are constructed so
that they do not include any verbal interventions or interest rate news. Consequently, the evaluation
and the comparison of the pre-event and the post-event windows consider only those windows,
which do not contain any verbal interventions or interest rate news. In addition, pre- and post-event
windows are not allowed to overlap with previous or following intervention events. In other words,
if there is a verbal intervention/interest news/actual intervention event in t￿14 preceding a given
intervention event, only the 1-, 2-, 5- and 10-day pre- and post-event windows are studied. If, in
addition, there is any verbal intervention/interest news/intervention event in, say, t+9 following the
same intervention event, the analysis is restricted to the 1-, 2- and 5-day windows, given that larger
windows are contaminated by the effect of other types of information. A practical consequence of
this is that the number of longer pre- and post-event windows without overlaps drops dramatically
or even to zero in some cases, which makes it impossible to analyze the effectiveness of actual
interventions for some of the windows in some countries (see Appendix).
For Turkey, two intervention series are analyzed. In the ￿rst series, we consider only discre-
tionary interventions, because the central bank asserted in a number of statements and publications
that FX auctions were not intended to in￿uence the exchange rate but used to build up foreign ex-
change reserves. However, because FX auctions were carried out during long periods of time with
large numbers of foreign exchange transactions, we also employ intervention data, which combine
discretionary and FX auction interventions.
For the Czech Republic, the investigated period ends in end-2002, given that no interventions
took place after 2002.
19Given that the Hungarian central bank simultaneously used actual and verbal interventions and
the interest rate instrument during the only intervention episode in January 2003, we found no pre-
and post-event windows without overlap. Therefore, the net effect of actual interventions on the
exchange rate cannot be assessed for this country.
The results of the non-parametrical sign test show weak or nonexistent effects of aggregate
actual interventions on the exchange rate (see Appendix). The reported p-values clearly indicate
that actual interventions do not have a signi￿cant in￿uence on the exchange rate in Romania and
Turkey. In the Czech Republic, the results are sensitive to the de￿nition of the intervention event
with regard to the number of days that passed with no intervention activity between two individual
intervention acts: while leaning against the wind for the 2-day pre- and post-event window is de-
tected at the 10% signi￿cance level with the 10-, 20- or 30-day event de￿nition, interventions seem
to have no systematic in￿uence on the exchange rate with the 2- and 5-day event de￿nitions. In
Croatia, the results are similarly sensitive to the event de￿nition between 1996 and 2006. Although
all event de￿nitions yield signi￿cant results for the 10-day pre- and post-event window size if we
analyze only the second half of the sample, i.e. 2001 to 2006, the type of the success remains
questionable (exchange rate smoothing or leaning against the wind). For Slovakia, a robust leaning
against the wind effect is detected for the 10-day window.
6.2 Net Effect of FX Interventions: Does Direction Matter?
Thus far, we have analyzed the combined effect of domestic currency sales and purchases. Now
we will focus on the effectiveness of separate sales and purchases. The results are summarized in
Table 5; they provide more evidence of successful interventions than the aggregated intervention
data.
Actual interventions are found to be successful to slow down or even reverse the appreciation
of the domestic currency at shorter time horizons. For instance, domestic currency sales in Croatia
turnedappreciationintodepreciationatthe2-and10-dayhorizon, whilesimilareffectsarefoundin
theCzechRepublicforthe1-and2-daypre-andpost-eventwindows. InTurkey, onlydiscretionary
20lira-sale interventions had a signi￿cant impact on the exchange rate by reversing appreciation,
whereas the combination of discretionary and FX auction-based interventions was ineffective. For
Slovakia, the results indicate that koruna sales systematically led to exchange rate smoothing at
the 1-, 2- and 5-day time horizons. Contrary to the other countries, it was not possible to analyze
the effectiveness for pre- and post-event windows beyond 5 days owing to overlaps with other
intervention episodes, verbal interventions and interest rate news.
In contrast, in the ￿ght against currency depreciations, domestic currency purchases turn out to
haveasigni￿cantimpactontheexchangerateonlyinSlovakia. Forthiscountry, signi￿cantleaning
against the wind effects are detected in particular for the 5-day pre- and post-event window.
6.3 Net Effect of Verbal Interventions and Interest Rate News
In order to assess whether verbal interventions or changes in the key interest rate are capable of
inducing systematic changes in the exchange rate, we used individual observations on verbal in-
terventions and on policy rate changes to construct events. We would like to single out the net
effect of verbal interventions and interest news; hence, verbal intervention events are not allowed
to contain interest rate news and actual interventions. Similarly, interest news events do not in-
clude verbal and actual interventions. Furthermore, only those pre- and post-event windows are
considered in which no actual or verbal intervention and interest news occurred.
The results are fairly striking (see Table 5). Interest news adjusted for actual and verbal inter-
ventions have no effect on the exchange rate in Croatia, Romania, Slovakia and Turkey. Policy rate
changes were able to smooth the exchange rate, but not to reverse the trend in the Czech Republic
and Hungary at the 20-day and 30-day horizons, respectively, but only when they were used to
counteract exchange rate appreciation.
Verbal interventions adjusted for actual interventions and interest news were not effective in
all countries except Hungary, where very short-term effects could be identi￿ed for those cases in
which central bank communication aimed at weakening appreciation pressures.
216.4 Combined Effect of Actual and Verbal Interventions and Interest Rate
News: Overall Impact
Having studied the net effect of actual and verbal interventions and interest rate news, we now
focus on the combined effect of these three factors on the exchange rate. We set out to answer
this intriguing question by constructing actual intervention events without eliminating verbal inter-
ventions and interest news. At the same time, pre- and post-event windows are allowed to include
verbal interventions and policy rate changes. However, we make sure that pre- and post-event win-
dows do not include previous or following intervention events in order to ￿lter out the cumulative
effect of actual interventions.
The results indicate that the inclusion of verbal interventions and interest news does not help im-
prove the effectiveness of actual interventions in Romania, where success could not be established
for any of the event de￿nitions and pre- and post-event window sizes.
The results show some improvement for Croatia (compared to the net effect of actual interven-
tions), as leaning-against-the-wind strategies are detected in a fairly robust manner for the 5-day
window and, to a lesser extent, for the 10-day window in the period from 2001 to 2006.
The effectiveness of FX interventions improves remarkably in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
One reason for this is that, compared with net actual interventions, longer-term pre- and post-
event windows were assessed, because the restriction due to overlaps with verbal interventions
and interest news was lifted. For the Czech Republic, leaning-against-the-wind strategies can be
observed at a 2-day horizon, which turn into very robust exchange rate smoothing beyond 30 days.
In the same way, longer-term strong effects of FX interventions were identi￿ed for Slovakia, as
actual interventions managed to reverse the exchange rate trend at the 10- to 30-day horizons.
For Turkey, actual discretionary interventions combined with verbal interventions and interest
rate news turn out to be very effective, with signi￿cant exchange rate smoothing being observed
for the 5-day window and with very robust leaning against the wind detected for the 40- and 50-
day pre- and post-event windows, irrespective of the de￿nition of the intervention event. At the
22same time, the combination of discretionary and FX auction-based interventions yields leaning-
against-the-wind outcomes for the 10-day window and provides us with some suggestive evidence
for exchange rate smoothing at the longer end of the spectrum.
The single intervention event observed in Hungary was highly effective in turning the appreci-
ation of the exchange rate into a depreciation at all horizons investigated.
Ingeneral, actualinterventionscombinedwithcentralbankcommunicationandnewsoninterest
rate policy are more powerful in affecting the exchange rate in such a way as de￿ned by our
success criteria. First, the results are less sensitive to different event window de￿nitions. Second,
and perhaps more importantly, the results indicate a longer lasting (up to 60 days) effect of actual
interventions on the exchange rate.
A straightforward explanation for the dramatic increase in effectiveness is that, as shown in
Figure 2, actual interventions are clustered with verbal interventions and interest rate steps. From
a technical viewpoint, this implies that pre- and post-event windows cannot be assessed at longer
time horizons without overlapping between the three factors. However, an increase in the number
of assessable windows should not per se lead to better results. The reason why the rate of success ￿
and thus the statistical impact of FX interventions on the exchange rate ￿ rises is that, if actual and
verbal interventions and interest rate steps are clustered, they will often go in the same direction,
i.e. they either support or weaken the domestic currency. It is precisely this mutual backing of the
three factors which is most probably at the heart of the enhanced effectiveness.
6.5 Combined Effect: Does Direction Matter?
Disentangling the effects of domestic currency sales and purchases con￿rms our earlier results
on the ineffectiveness of FX interventions in Romania and shows that in the Czech Republic and
Turkey, the results obtained for actual interventions supported by central bank communication and
interest rate news re￿ect the effect of domestic currency sales aimed at slowing down or revers-
ing nominal appreciation. However, this approach reveals a more nuanced picture. In the Czech
Republic, domestic currency sales appear to be even more successful than indicated by the aggre-
23gated data. In Turkey, discretionary interventions become slightly weaker in the longer run, while
the combination of discretionary and auction-based interventions is a little more successful at the
2- and 5-day pre- and post-event windows. No changes are observed for Hungary, given that the
single intervention event relates to domestic currency sales.
Disaggregation delivers more insight regarding the nature of success in Croatia and Slovakia.
These are the two countries in which actual interventions in both directions are found to be ef-
fective. For Croatia, this is, however, true only for the period running from 2001 to 2006: Ac-
tual interventions were capable of reversing the trend of the exchange rate in both directions. In
Slovakia, koruna sales tended to smooth the exchange rate at the 30-day horizon, while koruna
purchases were even able to break a depreciation trend up to 60 days. Interestingly, however, dis-
aggregating the results into currency sales and purchases in Croatia and Slovakia (contrary to the
other countries) induces some sensitivity with regard to different event de￿nitions.
6.6 Cumulative Effect of Actual Interventions
The￿nalstageofouranalysisconsistsoftakingintoaccounttheeffectsofoverlappingintervention
events in the evaluation of the pre- and post-event windows. In other words, the windows are not
adjusted for previous and following intervention events. In this way, the cumulative effect of
previous and following FX interventions is also measured for any given intervention event, thus
adding to the effect of the already included verbal interventions and interest rate news.
This does not only increase the number of assessable windows at longer time horizons, but ap-
parently also raises the effectiveness of FX interventions via domestic currency sales. For instance,
in Romania, actual interventions ￿ thus far completely unsuccessful ￿ show signs of moderate suc-
cess in smoothing exchange rate appreciation. This is because intervention data are a mixture of
daily and monthly data. This leads to frequent overlaps between intervention events and the exclu-
sion of such overlapping events. By contrast, the cumulative effect allows the assessment of such
overlapping events.
Furthermore, the cumulative effect of actual interventions is positive for Croatia and Slovakia
24when the central bank aims at slowing down depreciation or even reversing the trend. Defending
the national currency against depreciation seems to be statistically signi￿cant also in the Czech
Republic and Turkey. Nonetheless, the combined effect of discretionary and auction-based inter-
ventions vanishes for Turkey.
25Table 5. Summary of the results
HR-1 HR-2 CZ HU RO SK TK-1 TK-2
Net effect of FX interventions central bank communication and interest news
FX int: Overall W30? S/W10 W2? ￿ NO S1? W5?,10 NO NO
FX int: Weaken W2,10 W2?,10 W1,2 ￿ NO S1?,5 W2 W2 NO
FX int: Strengthen NO NO NO NO NO W1?,5 NO NO
Verbal int: Overall NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Verbal int: Weaken NO NO NO S1 NO NO NO NO
Verbal int: Strengthen NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Interest News: Overall NO NO S20? S30 NO NO NO NO
Interest News: Weaken NO NO S20? S30 NO NO NO NO
Interest News: Strengthen NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Combined effect of FX interventions, central bank communication and interest news
Excluding overlaps between FX intervention events
Overall S5?,10? W5,S/W10
W2
S10?,30-60
W1-60 NO W10-30
S5 W30?
W40,50
W10
S 15-40?
Weaken W2? W5?,10
W2, 20
S10?15?
S30-60
W1-60 NO
W2, 20?
W30?S1?
S5,15?40?
W2,40?
W50?
W2,5,10
S15-40?
Strengthen NO W5-40? NO ￿ NO
W5-15
W30-60?
NO NO
Including overlaps between FX intervention events
Overall NO
S5,10?
S15,20
S30?40-60 ￿ NO
W10?
S15,60
S0,5?
W 30?
W 5-15?
Weaken NO
W2?5?10
S20
W2,10,30?
W40?
W50,60
￿
S0,20?
30?60?
S1?5?15
S40?50
S60 W2?
W20 NO
Strengthen NO W10-60? W5-10 ￿ NO
W5,10
W15?20
30 50? 60
S0,10
W2,20?
W2-30
Notes: HR-1 refers to the whole period and HR-2 to the period from 2001 to 2006 in Croatia. CZ, HU, RO and SK denote the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Romania and Slovakia. TK-1 and TK-2 represent discretionary interventions and the combination of discretionary and auction-based interventions in Turkey.
Overall stands for aggregate data, while weaken and strengthen denote the respective effect of interventions on the domestic currency. S stands for exchange
rate smoothing, and W represents against-the-wind outcomes. The ￿gures after S or W denote the pre-and post-event window size for which the nonparametric
sign tests are signi￿cant for all event de￿nitions. ? indicates that the results are only signi￿cant for three or four out of ￿ve possible
(2-, 5-, 10-, 20- and 30-day) event de￿nitions.
266.7 Impact of FX Interventions on FX Volatility
Two out of the six central banks under study explicitly state in their of￿cial policy that they will
intervene on the FX market in order to decrease excessive FX volatility. For this reason, we also
use the event study approach to analyze whether there is a systematic increase or decrease in FX
volatility, measured in terms of standard deviation, in the aftermath of central bank intervention.
22
For Turkey, where the FX volatility target is a most prominent feature, we ￿nd that the net
effects of discretionary FX interventions indeed decreased FX volatility systematically in the event
that the central bank sold Turkish lira to counteract currency appreciation. However, this effect
evaporates when we take into account the effect of central bank communication, interest rate news
and possible overlaps between actual intervention events. Interventions that also include auction-
based interventions have no impact on exchange rate volatility if considered alone, but they result
in lower FX volatility once the other factors are included. For Slovakia, the second country with the
of￿cial objective to decrease FX volatility, we detected neither a positive nor a negative in￿uence
on FX volatility when we use data disaggregated into purchases and sales. Still, FX volatility
seemed to rise as a result of FX interventions for the 10-day pre- and post-event windows.
Changes in exchange rate volatility owing to FX interventions can be viewed as a side effect
of intervention activity aimed at in￿uencing the level of the exchange rate. For Croatia, net FX
interventions tend to increase FX volatility for the 5- to 15-day pre- and post-event windows,
in particular when the central bank tries to counteract appreciation pressures. While volatility
decreased at the short 5-day horizon after FX interventions, it increased (just like in Croatia) for
the 10- to 15-day window when the Czech National Bank sold domestic currency. In Romania,
central bank interventions turn out to be neutral to the variability of the exchange rate, while in
Hungary, exchange rate volatility decreased after the single intervention episode.
22 The results are not reported here in order to save space. However, they are available from the author upon request.
276.8 Comparison with the Existing Literature
How do our results compare with those reported in the literature? As noted earlier, Turkey and
the Czech Republic have so far been covered extensively in the literature, and most of the studies
use econometric estimations. For Turkey, Domac and Mendoza (2004) ￿nd that, on the basis of
EGARCH estimations, only lira purchases have an in￿uence on the exchange rate vis-￿-vis the
dollar from February 2001 to May 2002. Lira purchases indeed strengthened the exchange rate
and decrease exchange rate volatility. The estimations carried out by Guimaraes and Karacadag
(2004) for a two-year period running from March 2001 to October 2003 based on the component
GARCH model yielded fairly different results, as central bank interventions did not affect the
level of the exchange rate. In addition, only lira purchases impacted on exchange rate volatility:
it decreased in the short run, but increased in the long run as a result of interventions. Using a
very similar period (March 2001 to May 2003), Akinci et al. (2005a) show that lira sales led to
a depreciation of the exchange especially in 2003. This is broadly con￿rmed by the event study
approach. In a companion paper, Akinci et al. (2005b) show that interventions will be ineffective,
if the estimations are based on a simple GARCH model. However, the estimation results also
indicate that large and isolated interventions tend to decrease exchange rate volatility, whereas
other types of intervention (small and auction-based ones) usually raise volatility.
Our results, based on a substantially longer period (2001￿2006), indicate that discretionary lira
sales are associated with a depreciation of the domestic currency in the short run. This supports
the ￿nding of Akinci et al. (2005a). However, when we also consider the effect of central bank
communication and interest rate news, discretionary lira sales appear to have a longer-term (up
to 60 day) mostly leaning-against-the-wind type of impact on the lira. Regarding exchange rate
volatility, we ￿nd that only discretionary lira sales diminish exchange rate volatility and that this
effect vanishes once verbal communication and interest rate news are properly accounted for.
For the Czech Republic, the instrumental variable approach reported in Disyatat and Galati
(2005) yields a weakly signi￿cant in￿uence on the exchange rate in the Czech Republic between
282001 and 2002, while ￿gert and KomÆrek (2006) and Ger￿l and Holub (2006) report statistically
signi￿cant but quantitatively not very large effects of interventions on the exchange rate using
GARCH models for the period 1997 to 2002 and instrumental variable estimation for 2001 to
2003, respectively. Scalia (2006) establishes a quantitatively much stronger effect for intraday
exchange rate data from July to September 2002.
Applying the event study approach to monthly data, Ger￿l and Holub (2006) ￿nd that inter-
ventions are successful in changing the exchange rate. However, they do not test the statistical
signi￿cance of the pooled events. ￿gert and KomÆrek (2006) employ the sign bias test and shed
light on the fact that actual interventions are only effective if combined with interest rate steps up
to 40 days. Our results add more color to the picture in that they illustrate that koruna sales can
reverse an appreciation trend on their own, albeit only in the very short run, and that combining
interventions with central bank communication and interest rate news is very powerful in altering
the trend of the exchange rate even up to 60 days. This suggests that appropriate central bank
communication can enhance the effects of actual interventions and interest rate news.
Finally, Gereben, Gyomai and Kiss (2006) estimate the effectiveness of central bank interven-
tions in Hungary by incorporating interventions in an order ￿ow model of the exchange rate. The
results indicate that interventions were successful only during the January 2003 crisis period, but
not afterwards. The ￿rst result is in line with our results, which, however, are conditional on the
effects of interest rate news and central bank communication. We argue that FX interventions after
the January crisis were limited to selling off the reserves accumulated during the crisis, and to
FX purchases for the government for servicing FX-denominated public debt. Consequently, the
presence of the central bank on the FX market was not intended to in￿uence the exchange rate.
Nevertheless, Gereben, Gyomai and Kiss (2006) consider FX sales and purchases as proper cen-
tral bank interventions after January 2003 and reveal their ineffectiveness, which ￿ in our view ￿
only con￿rms that the central bank had no intention of in￿uencing the exchange rate with these
measures.
296.9 Sterilized vs. Unsterilized Interventions
It is worth analyzing our results from a perspective of sterilization. We showed earlier that FX
interventions are not fully sterilized in Croatia, while they are most probably sterilized in the
other countries. Our results indicate that FX interventions have an effect on the exchange rate
in Croatia. Yet this effect is not stronger than, for instance, in the Czech Republic or Slovakia,
where interventions are sterilized.
The argument that unsterilized interventions automatically lead to changes in the exchange rate
reliesontheempiricalvalidityofthemonetarymodeloftheexchangerate. Themonetarymodel, in
turn, restsontwoassumptions, namelythat(1)changesinmoneysupplyarere￿ectedinpricesviaa
stable money demand function, (2) which affects the nominal exchange rate through the purchasing
power parity condition that links prices and the nominal exchange rate (existence of PPP for the
real exchange rate). However, both assumptions rest on shaky grounds: First, money demand
functions are notoriously unstable in transition economies, and second, PPP fails not only for the
overall real exchange rate but also for the real exchange rate of the open sector (which is crucial
for establishing the relationship between the exchange rate and money demand), as documented
e.g. in ￿gert, Halpern and MacDonald (2006).
Despite these dif￿culties, Crespo-Cuaresma, Fidrmuc and MacDonald (2005), using panel data,
show that the monetary model works fairly well for transition economies. However, Crespo-
Cuaresma, Fidrmuc and Silgoner (2005) analyze the monetary model for individual countries and
￿nd that, while the monetary model is well suited to track down exchange rate movements in
Romania and Turkey, it is unable to explain exchange rate developments in Bulgaria and Croa-
tia. This outcome implies that, even though FX interventions are not necessarily fully sterilized
in Croatia, their impact on the exchange rate is not proportionate because of the failure of the
monetary model.
23
23 Anadditionalcomplicationisthatthemonetarymodelisvalidatedusingsomelong-termcoef￿cients(cointegration
techniques). This says little about how good the monetary model is at higher frequencies.
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In this study, we investigated the effectiveness of FX interventions in six emerging European coun-
tries employing the event study methodology. We found that central bank interventions adjusted
for other factors were successful in slowing down or reversing an exchange rate trend in the short
run, i.e. up to 10 days, in Croatia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Turkey. Short-term suc-
cess was most pronounced when interventions aimed to ease appreciation pressures. At the same
time, interventions were found to be ineffective in Romania and not assessable at all in Hungary
because interventions overlapped with other factors. Using the event study methodology, it is dif-
￿cult to establish which channel interventions affect the exchange rate. Three channels may play
a role in Croatia, where interventions are announced in advance: the signaling channel, the port-
folio channel as well as the microstructure (order-￿ow) channel. However, for the other countries
with secret discretionary interventions, we assume that only the portfolio and the microstructure
channels transmit the effect of interventions to the exchange rate.
While the sign bias test reveals very short-term effects of central bank communication only for
Hungary and longer-term in￿uence of interest news only for the Czech Republic and Hungary,
interventions coupled with central bank communication and backed by interest rate moves turn out
to have a longer lasting effect on the exchange rate for all countries. This holds especially true for
domestic currency sales. In addition, if different intervention events are allowed to amplify each
other’s effect, even domestic currency purchases turn out to cope successfully with a depreciation
of the domestic currency in Croatia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Turkey.
However, the observed outcome can be viewed as a real success only, if it is in line with the
of￿cially stated objectives of central bank interventions. As a matter of fact, the observed effect
of interventions on the exchange rate is generally compatible with the central banks’ objectives
relating to changes in the exchange rate in Croatia, the Czech Republic and, to a lesser extent, in
Romania and with the objective of maintaining the ￿uctuation bands in Hungary.
31This, however, cannot be fully said for Slovakia and Turkey based on the results of the event
study analysis for the period from 1999 to 2006 and from 2001 to 2006, respectively. Although the
National Bank of Slovakia successfully counteracts what it calls excessive depreciation and appre-
ciation pressures, the goal of reducing exchange rate volatility has apparently remained unful￿lled.
The central bank of Turkey does not achieve the single aim of systematically reducing exchange
rate volatility via discretionary interventions with a combination of verbal interventions and inter-
est rate news. Moreover, a side-effect of discretionary and also of auction-based interventions is
their signi￿cant impact on the exchange rate.
We also looked into the issue of sterilization and found that most central banks, perhaps with the
exception of Croatia, tended to fully sterilize FX interventions. Interestingly, this partial steriliza-
tion in Croatia does not lead to a substantial improvement of the effectiveness of FX interventions
as compared to the other countries ￿ the monetary model, which ensures that unsterilized inter-
ventions are transmitted to the exchange rate, is not operational in Croatia (see Crespo-Cuaresma,
Fidrmuc and Silgoner, 2005). This makes us cautious about the generally accepted view that un-
sterilized interventions automatically in￿uence the exchange rate.
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Appendix A. Monetary Framework and Institutional Background
A1. Monetary policy framework
Croatia switched to a managed ￿oat in 1993 which is maintained up to now. In practice, how-
ever, the exchange rate of the kuna against the German mark and later on against the euro was
maintained by means of frequent FX interventions in a narrow band of around 10% with the im-
plicit ￿uctuation band being even narrower during some periods. The stability of the kuna bore
fruit early on as hyperin￿ation was quickly tamed and in￿ation was stabilized in one-digit territory
from 1995 onward (see Table A1).
The Czech Republic and Slovakia used ￿xed exchange rates successfully to bring down in￿ation
from around 60% in 1991￿ chie￿y a consequence of price liberalization ￿ to below 10% in 1995.
However, the Czech koruna came under increasing pressure on the FX market in the ￿rst half of
1997 because of long-delayed macroeconomic restructuring coupled with political turbulence and
35with the start of the Asian currency crisis in Thailand. The speculative attack, largely facilitated
by extensive capital account liberalization, forced the Czech National Bank and the government
to abandon the peg and announce the introduction of a managed ￿oat on May 26, 1997. Slovakia
followed suit one year later, as FX reserves were declining at a rapid pace in the aftermath of
the Russian crisis, and introduced a managed ￿oat on October 1, 1998. Under the ￿oat, both the
Czech and the Slovak central banks kept an eye on the domestic currency’s exchange rate vis-￿-
vis the German mark and the euro and intervened periodically on the FX markets, even though
the exchange rate anchor was replaced by the announced in￿ation target under the direct in￿ation
targeting framework introduced in 1998 in the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic complied with
Article VIII of the IMF from October 1, 1995, onward and joined the OECD in December 1995.
FX interventions were motivated by the fear that large exchange rate ￿uctuations could possibly
have painful consequences on the real economy because of the high degree of trade openness.
Hungary and Romania stuck to pegged regimes longer that the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
After having operated a narrow pegged regime with frequent discretionary devaluations, Hungary
adopted a pre-announced crawling peg regime with a band of ￿2.25% around the central parity in
March 1995 as part of a stabilization program aimed at reducing internal and external imbalances.
As a result of economic reforms, both foreign direct and portfolio investment started to ￿ow in,
which pushed the exchange rate to the stronger edge of the band. This forced the central bank to
step in and sell domestic currency. In the crawling peg regime, the progressive reduction of the
pre-announced rate of crawl (devaluation of the central parity) contributed to a gradual reduction of
in￿ation. However, in￿ation got stuck at 10% in 2000 at a time when the rate of crawl was virtually
zero. Against this backdrop, the ￿uctuations band was widened to ￿15% in May 2001. The
exchange rate appreciated immediately and gave new impetus to disin￿ation. Within the in￿ation
targeting framework, which was introduced in June 2001, heavy weight has been given to the
exchange rate. Indeed, the exchange rate has remained on the stronger side of the ￿uctuation band
ever since. The main tools of stabilizing the exchange rate were interest rate policy and verbal
36interventions. Similar to the crawling peg system, the central bank intervenes only at the upper and
lower edges of the band.
Table A1. Average annual CPI rates in transition economies and in Turkey, 1990￿2004.
% ’91 ’92 ’93 ’94 ’95 ’96 ’97 ’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 ’04
Croatia 123.0 665.5 1517.5 97.6 2.0 3.5 3.6 5.7 4.2 6.2 4.9 1.7 1.8 2.1 3.4
Czech Rep. 56.6 11.1 20.8 10.0 9.1 8.8 8.5 10.7 2.1 3.9 4.7 1.8 0.1 2.8 1.9
Hungary 35.0 23.0 22.5 18.8 28.2 23.6 18.3 14.3 10.0 9.8 9.2 5.3 4.7 6.8 3.8
Romania 170.2 210.4 256.1 136.8 32.3 38.8 154.8 59.1 45.8 45.7 34.5 22.5 15.3 11.9 9.1
Slovakia 61.2 10.0 23.2 13.4 9.9 5.8 6.1 6.7 10.6 12.0 7.1 3.3 8.5 7.5 2.5
Turkey 66.0 70.1 66.1 106.3 88.1 80.4 85.7 84.6 64.9 54.9 54.4 45.0 25.3 8.6 8.2
Source: WIIW and IFS/IMF (Turkey)
Note: In￿ation rates refer to the national CPIs and not to the harmonized consumer price indexes published by Eurostat.
Romania operated an implicit crawling band system, in which the exchange rate underwent
gradual but systematic and sometimes large depreciations guided by FX interventions. As a result
￿ and because of the lack of economic reforms and credible macroeconomic policies ￿ in￿ation and
in￿ationary expectations remained high during the 1990s (see Table A1). Economic restructuring
has speeded up and economic policy has gained more credibility over the last ￿ve years or so.
Accompanied by the liberalization of capital movements, this has attracted considerable foreign
investment, which has made it more dif￿cult to continue the tight management of the exchange
rate. Consequently, the Romanian central bank decided to let the leu ￿oat in November 2004. This
can be viewed as a preparatory step toward direct in￿ation targeting implemented in mid-2005.
Note that the National Bank of Romania had an implicit in￿ation target since 1998 that has been
laid down in Romania’s Medium-Term Economic Strategy since 2001. The new exchange rate
regime is a managed ￿oat and the central bank intervenes occasionally on the FX market.
Just like Romania, Turkey has a long-standing record of high in￿ation. The latest attempt of
stabilization, which rested on a pre-announced crawling peg exchange rate regime culminated in
a currency crisis in early 2001. As a result, a ￿oating exchange rate regime was introduced in
Turkey on February 22, 2001. This was part of a new monetary policy framework, which can
be best described as implicit in￿ation targeting. Under this regime, the central bank pursues an
37in￿ation target at a given horizon in the future. The central bank’s main instruments are short-
term interest rates. The base money and net international reserves are used as ￿indicative criteria￿,
which can be perhaps deemed as intermediate targets. Net domestic assets, measuring domestic
credit expansion, are considered as an indicator of the monetary policy stance. This monetary
policy framework was underpinned with the amendment of the Central Bank Act on May 5, 2001,
which aimed at securing the operational independence of the central bank. Notwithstanding the
limited role of FX interventions in such a framework, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
intervened on a number of occasions on the FX markets between 2001 and early 2006.
A2. Objectives of FX Interventions
Croatia
HNB (2001, p. 33): ￿The kuna/euro value grew by 1.8% in nominal terms in July in comparison
with end-June, while it had strengthened by 0.5% in July 2000. In an effort to eases the intense
appreciation of the exchange rate of the kuna against the euro, the central bank purchases from
banks a total of USD 122.9m.￿
HNB (2001, p. 34): ￿The last quarter of 2001 was marked by a nominal appreciation of the kuna
against the euro of 2.3% (...). In an effort to keep exchange rate movements within satisfactory
stability boundaries, the central bank purchased from banks a total of USD 338.5m.￿
HNB, 2003, p. 40): ￿In this period, the kuna weakened against the euro by a total of 3.4% (...).
The kuna depreciation stimulated the sale of foreign exchange at the central bank’s auctions in the
￿rst quarter of 2003.￿
Czech Republic
Intheimmediateaftermathofthespeculativerunagainstthekoruna, theCNBstrivedtostabilize
the exchange rate against the German mark and announced a target band of 17￿19.5 CZK/DEM
(33.5￿38.5 CZK/EUR) (￿m￿dkova et al., 1998, pp. 10￿11).
38Interventions were made in case of ￿major deviations of the exchange rate that are not connected
with domestic economic fundamentals and domestic monetary policy￿ (CNB, 1998, p. 46).
CNB (1998, p 33.): ￿The CNB intervened on the foreign exchange market to moderate the
appreciation pressures generated by the foreign capital in￿ow.￿
CNB (1999, p 45.): ￿the koruna’s exchange rate was affected by the CNB’s interventions to
prevent an excessive koruna appreciation.￿
CNB (2000, p. 48): ￿The koruna’s nominal exchange rate against the euro exhibited an overall
appreciation tendency in 2000. This gradual strengthening was interrupted at end-Q1 by the CNB’s
foreign exchange interventions to prevent excessive appreciation of the koruna...￿
CNB (2002, p. 36): ￿The koruna continued to appreciate (...). As a result, at its extraordi-
nary meeting on 21 January 2002 the Bank Board (...) also approved intervention in the foreign
exchange market.￿
Romania
NBR (2005b, p 7.): ￿The pressure causing the domestic currency to strengthen in nominal terms
against the euro stepped up signi￿cantly. The central bank viewed this process as unsustainable
and therefore bought large amounts of foreign currency in the foreign exchange market￿.
NBR (2005c, p. 33): ￿In an attempt to dampen volatile capital in￿ows and to put a halt to
the excessive appreciation of the RON, in July￿August, the central bank purchases a record high
volume of foreign currency on the forex market￿.
NBR (2005a, p. 7): ￿...the central bank’s intervention in the foreign exchange market, which
was chie￿y aimed at maintaining, as from March, a relatively steady level of foreign exchange
reserves (in terms of import months)...￿.
Slovakia
NBS (2001, p. 65): ￿The National Bank of Slovakia may intervene in the interbank foreign
exchange market in the event of excessive volatility in the exchange rate of the Slovak koruna￿.
39Very similar statements can be found in NBS (1998, p. 65), NBS (2000, p. 56) and NBS (2002, p.
56).
NBS (2002, p. 60): ￿This led to growing pressure for appreciation in the exchange rate of
the Slovak koruna in the ￿rst half of November. This exchange rate development was caused
mostly by non-economic and speculative factors, and was not in accordance with the actual course
of economic development. For this reason, the NBS intervened in the foreign exchange market
against appreciation of the currency...￿
NBS (2003, p. 70): ￿The National Bank of Slovakia intervened in the foreign exchange market
in the event of excessive volatility in the exchange rate of the Slovak koruna and/or if the exchange
rate did not correspond to the indicators of macroeconomic developments.￿ See also NBS (2004,
p. 62).
Turkey
CBRT (2001, p. 109): ￿The Central Bank conducted regular FX sales auctions after March 29
in order to smooth excessive short-run exchange rate ￿uctuations without affecting the long-run
equilibrium level of exchange rates...￿
CBRT (2002, p. 71): ￿...the Central Bank announced that it would intervene in the foreign
exchange rate market in a strictly limited fashion to prevent excessive volatility without targeting
a certain trend level.￿
CBRT (2004, paragraph 34): ￿The Bank has not performed any foreign exchange buying or
selling operations intended at determining the level or direction of the exchange rates. The Bank’s
foreign exchange buying or selling operations aimed at controlling excessive volatilities.￿
CBRT (2004, p. 73): ￿The CBRT (...) would hold foreign exchange purchase auctions in order
to increase foreign exchange reserves without distorting the long-run tendency and equilibrium
value of the exchange rate.￿
CBRT (2003, p.97): ￿(...) it would directly intervene in the event of excessive volatility that
40might occur in both directions.￿ See also CBRT (2004, p. 73).
CBRT (2002, p. 96): ￿(...) the Central Bank did not target any exchange rate level and that it
would respond symmetrically to both upward and downward volatility.￿
41Appendix B. Results
Table B1. Actual interventions adjusted for verbal interventions and interest news
NONPARAMETRIC SIGN TEST – p-values
PRE- AND POST-EVENT WINDOW
EVENT SIZE W 1 2 5 10 15 20 30 40 50 60
Croatia 1996 - 2006
2 DAYS wind 0.997 1.000 1.000 0.964 0.277 0.500 0.287 0.250
smooth 0.978 1.000 1.000 0.138 0.087 0.066 0.500 0.750
5 DAYS wind 0.805 1.000 0.994 0.962 0.188 0.238 0.301 0.146 0.250 0.250
smooth 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.095 0.188 0.238 0.301 0.854 0.102 0.102
10 DAYS wind 0.884 1.000 0.962 0.446 0.249 0.410 0.500 0.091 0.250 0.250
smooth 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.554 0.155 0.410 0.500 0.909 0.102 0.102
20 DAYS wind 0.937 1.000 0.967 0.500 0.107 0.406 0.406 0.187 0.500 0.500
smooth 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.735 0.663 0.594 0.594 0.942 0.146 0.146
30 DAYS wind 0.852 1.000 0.952 0.500 0.077 0.384 0.384 0.077 0.500 0.500
smooth 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.633 0.969 0.971 0.971 0.975 0.146 0.146
Croatia 2001 - 2006
2 DAYS wind 0.881 1.000 0.864 0.500 0.250 0.384 0.271
smooth 0.962 0.997 1.000 0.500 0.004 0.080 0.271
5 DAYS wind 0.616 1.000 0.888 0.208 0.154 0.152 0.287 0.250
smooth 0.997 0.986 1.000 0.565 0.006 0.301 0.135 0.750
10 DAYS wind 0.607 0.999 0.792 0.043 0.211 0.312 0.500 0.146
smooth 0.998 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.002 0.500 0.301 0.854
20 DAYS wind 0.699 0.998 0.765 0.163 0.054 0.301 0.301 0.146
smooth 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.578 0.238 0.699 0.301 0.854
30 DAYS wind 0.393 0.992 0.657 0.133 0.029 0.250 0.250 0.058
smooth 0.998 0.999 1.000 0.410 0.807 0.989 0.902 0.942
Czech Republic
2 DAYS wind 0.920 0.108 0.172 0.881 0.302 0.302 0.500
smooth 0.807 0.999 0.993 0.119 0.302 0.302 0.146
5 DAYS wind 0.957 0.210 0.147 0.813 0.302 0.302 0.500
smooth 0.729 0.998 0.983 0.500 0.302 0.302 0.146
10 DAYS wind 0.935 0.135 0.077 0.813 0.302 0.302 0.500
smooth 0.627 0.998 0.975 0.500 0.302 0.302 0.146
20/30 DAYS wind 0.853 0.135 0.077 0.813 0.302 0.302 0.500
smooth 0.358 0.998 0.975 0.500 0.302 0.302 0.146
Hungary
The single event -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Romania
2/5/10 DAYS wind 0.750 0.698 0.146 0.750
smooth 0.750 0.909 0.854 0.102
20/30 DAYS wind 0.750 0.500 0.250
smooth 0.750 0.854 0.750
Slovakia
2 DAYS wind 0.607 0.500 0.600 0.271 0.053
smooth 0.987 0.834 0.999 0.271 0.854
5 DAYS wind 0.848 0.713 0.384 0.172 0.053
smooth 0.699 0.020 0.997 0.172 0.854
10 DAYS wind 0.906 0.500 0.373 0.050 0.032 0.102 0.102
smooth 0.607 0.043 0.993 0.358 0.909 0.750 0.750
20/30 DAYS wind 0.807 0.147 0.777 0.058 0.053 0.102 0.102
smooth 0.807 0.983 0.975 0.500 0.854 0.750 0.750
Turkey – Discretionary interventions
2 DAYS wind 0.688 0.225 0.883 0.302
smooth 0.969 0.999 0.005 0.302
5/10/20/30 DAYS wind 0.600 0.301 0.828 0.302
smooth 0.994 0.999 0.022 0.302
Turkey – Discretionary & auction-based interventions
2 DAYS wind 0.688 0.225 0.883 0.302
2 DAYS wind 0.358 0.250 0.950 0.698 0.102
smooth 0.983 0.989 0.983 0.032 0.750
5/10/20/30 DAYS wind 0.302 0.187 0.698 0.698 0.102
smooth 0.909 0.942 0.909 0.032 0.750
Notes: wind indicates leaning against the wind and smooth means exchange rate smoothing. Empty cells indicate that there are no assessable pre-
and post-event windows because of overlaps or no successful events. The column pre- and post-event window indicates the size of the windows.
W indicates that a pre-event window of 2 days is compared with exchange rate development within the event window. The event size columns
contain the alternative de￿nitions of the event window (how many days of no intervention activity separating two individual intervention acts
belonging to the same event). Bold ￿gures are lower than 0.1, indicating that the nonparametric sign test is statistically signi￿cant at least at the
10% level. 42Table B2. Actual interventions: direction matters
NONPARAMETRIC SIGN TEST – p-values
PRE- AND POST-EVENT WINDOW
EVENT SIZE W 1 2 5 10 15 20 30 40 50 60
DIRECTION: EXCHANGE RATE STRENGTHENING
Slovakia
2 DAYS wind 0.500 0.223 0.975 0.119 0.102
smooth 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
5 DAYS wind 0.500 0.119 0.962 0.058 0.102
smooth 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
10 DAYS wind 0.500 0.058 0.942 0.032 0.053 0.102 0.102
smooth 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
20/30 DAYS wind 0.500 0.058 0.942 0.032 0.053 0.102 0.102
smooth 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
DIRECTION: EXCHANGE RATE WEAKENING
Croatia 1996–2006
2 DAYS wind 0.993 1.000 0.025 0.832 0.054 0.271 0.271 0.250
smooth 0.935 1.000 1.000 0.943 0.594 0.271 0.729 0.750
5 DAYS wind 0.500 1.000 0.065 0.679 0.022 0.094 0.287 0.146 0.250 0.250
smooth 0.996 0.999 1.000 0.562 0.663 0.607 0.500 0.854 0.102 0.102
10 DAYS wind 0.678 1.000 0.050 0.249 0.042 0.225 0.500 0.091 0.250 0.250
smooth 0.998 1.000 1.000 0.633 0.578 0.775 0.699 0.909 0.102 0.102
20 DAYS wind 0.834 1.000 0.122 0.349 0.087 0.400 0.400 0.187 0.500 0.500
smooth 0.996 0.992 1.000 0.875 0.678 0.775 0.775 0.942 0.146 0.146
30 DAYS wind 0.699 1.000 0.077 0.415 0.094 0.500 0.500 0.119 0.500 0.500
smooth 0.991 0.964 1.000 0.585 0.906 0.957 0.957 0.962 0.146 0.146
Croatia 2001–2006
2 DAYS wind 0.942 1.000 0.129 0.657 0.094 0.250 0.250
smooth 0.942 0.997 1.000 0.942 0.210 0.500 0.500
5 DAYS wind 0.627 1.000 0.180 0.277 0.054 0.080 0.271 0.250
smooth 0.993 0.992 1.000 0.958 0.238 0.807 0.271 0.750
10 DAYS wind 0.729 0.995 0.087 0.071 0.087 0.210 0.500 0.146
smooth 0.995 0.999 1.000 0.856 0.087 0.906 0.500 0.854
20 DAYS wind 0.627 0.997 0.144 0.238 0.066 0.287 0.287 0.146
smooth 0.993 0.997 1.000 0.879 0.301 0.865 0.500 0.854
30 DAYS wind 0.358 0.978 0.077 0.287 0.065 0.358 0.358 0.091
smooth 0.983 0.978 0.999 0.500 0.627 0.983 0.853 0.909
Czech Republic
2 DAYS wind 0.902 0.054 0.098 0.813 0.146 0.146 0.250
smooth 0.902 0.998 0.989 0.058 0.146 0.146 0.102
5 DAYS wind 0.950 0.117 0.077 0.698 0.146 0.146 0.250
smooth 0.853 0.995 0.975 0.302 0.146 0.146 0.102
10 DAYS wind 0.923 0.065 0.038 0.698 0.146 0.146 0.250
smooth 0.777 0.993 0.962 0.302 0.146 0.146 0.102
20/30 DAYS wind 0.813 0.065 0.038 0.698 0.146 0.146 0.250
smooth 0.500 0.993 0.962 0.302 0.146 0.146 0.102
Slovakia
2 DAYS wind 0.500 0.627 0.033 0.500
smooth 0.957 0.172 0.989 0.008
5 DAYS wind 0.807 0.923 0.013 0.500
smooth 0.384 0.001 0.962 0.008
10 DAYS wind 0.883 0.881 0.020 0.302
smooth 0.271 0.002 0.942 0.032
20/30 DAYS wind 0.750 0.500 0.102
smooth 0.500 0.854 0.750
Turkey – discretionary interventions
2 DAYS wind 0.790 0.054 0.853 0.500
smooth 0.906 0.998 0.050 0.146
5/10/20/30 DAYS wind 0.713 0.080 0.777 0.500
smooth 0.980 0.997 0.223 0.146
Turkey – discretionary & auction-based interventions
2 DAYS wind 0.813 0.698 0.698 0.250
smooth 0.942 0.909 0.909 0.750
5/10/20/30 DAYS wind 0.500 0.250 0.250 0.250
smooth 0.854 0.750 0.750 0.750
Notes: see Table B1. Results for Romania are not displayed because success could not be identi￿ed for any of the event and
pre- and post-event window de￿nitions.
43Table B3. Interest news adjusted for actual and verbal interventions
NONPARAMETRIC SIGN TEST – p-values
PRE- AND POST-EVENT WINDOW
EVENT W 1 2 5 10 15 20 30 40 50 60
Hungary
2/5 DAYS wind 0.961 0.828 0.913 0.978 0.923 0.500 0.750
smooth 0.992 1.000 0.992 0.978 0.969 0.942 0.045
10 DAYS wind 0.975 0.780 0.942 0.962 0.946 0.500 0.750
smooth 0.947 1.000 0.942 0.985 0.879 0.942 0.045
20 DAYS wind 0.500 0.750 0.834 0.500 0.902 0.642 0.500 0.750
smooth 0.146 0.938 0.999 0.991 0.902 0.983 0.942 0.045
30 DAYS wind 0.250 0.688 0.607 0.500 0.500 0.337 0.302 0.750
smooth 0.750 0.834 0.998 0.980 0.777 0.962 0.909 0.045
Czech Republic
2 DAYS wind 0.995 0.573 0.989 0.590 0.920 0.902
smooth 0.989 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.807 0.098
5 DAYS wind 0.993 0.646 0.994 0.500 0.920 0.902
smooth 0.984 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.807 0.098
10 DAYS wind 0.996 0.716 0.991 0.590 0.920 0.902
smooth 0.978 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.807 0.098
20 DAYS wind 0.500 0.993 0.500 0.983 0.500 0.807 0.627
smooth 0.854 0.809 1.000 0.994 0.998 0.807 0.627
30 DAYS wind 0.663 0.980 0.500 0.950 0.813 0.302 0.146
smooth 0.962 0.865 0.998 0.358 0.500 0.909 0.854
Notes: see Table B1. The remaining countries are not reported because success could not be identi￿ed for any of the event and pre- and post-event window
de￿nitions.
Table B4. Interest news adjusted for actual and verbal interventions, weakening
NONPARAMETRIC SIGN TEST – p-values
PRE- AND POST-EVENT WINDOW
W 1 2 5 10 15 20 30 40 50 60
Hungary
2/5 DAYS wind 0.893 0.330 0.938 0.963 0.865 0.500 0.750
smooth 0.978 1.000 0.990 0.906 0.865 0.854 0.045
10 DAYS wind 0.929 0.250 0.962 0.934 0.906 0.500 0.750
smooth 0.856 1.000 0.913 0.934 0.607 0.854 0.045
20 DAYS wind 0.500 0.384 0.172 0.500 0.813 0.302 0.500 0.750
smooth 0.146 0.807 0.993 0.989 0.500 0.909 0.854 0.045
30 DAYS wind 0.373 0.050 0.642 0.698 0.500 0.500 0.750
smooth 0.627 0.983 0.983 0.302 0.854 0.854 0.045
Czech Republic
2 DAYS wind 0.998 0.154 0.982 0.600 0.883 0.853
smooth 0.921 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.729 0.050
5 DAYS wind 0.997 0.201 0.990 0.500 0.883 0.853
smooth 0.893 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.729 0.050
10 DAYS wind 0.998 0.260 0.985 0.600 0.883 0.853
smooth 0.856 1.000 0.998 0.999 0.729 0.050
20 DAYS wind 0.750 0.994 0.108 0.946 0.373 0.828 0.642
smooth 0.750 0.400 0.999 0.980 0.993 0.627 0.358
30 DAYS wind 0.813 0.967 0.098 0.881 0.500 0.500 0.250
smooth 0.942 0.500 0.989 0.119 0.146 0.854 0.750
Notes: see Table B3.
44Table B5. Verbal interventions adjusted for actual interventions
and interest news, strengthening, Hungary
NONPARAMETRIC SIGN TEST – p-values
PRE- AND POST-EVENT WINDOW
EVENT W 1 2 5 10 15 20 30 40 50 60
2 DAYS wind 0.853 0.050 0.853 0.250
smooth 0.006 0.983 0.853 0.750
5 DAYS wind 0.102 0.853 0.050 0.923 0.250
smooth 0.750 0.001 0.983 0.777 0.750
10 DAYS wind 0.053 0.500 0.187 0.942 0.500 0.750
smooth 0.854 0.008 0.942 0.500 0.854 0.750
20/30 DAYS wind 0.053 0.500 0.187 0.942 0.500 0.750
smooth 0.854 0.008 0.942 0.500 0.854 0.750
Notes: see Table B3
45Table B6. FX interventions ￿ the combined effect
NONPARAMETRIC SIGN TEST – p-values
PRE- AND POST-EVENT WINDOW
EVENT W 1 2 5 10 15 20 30 40 50 60
Croatia 1996–2001
2 DAYS wind 0.997 1.000 1.000 0.982 0.633 0.678 0.301 0.500 0.302 0.250
smooth 0.993 1.000 1.000 0.030 0.048 0.087 0.301 0.500 0.302 0.750
5 DAYS wind 0.740 1.000 0.998 0.975 0.500 0.415 0.312 0.500 0.663 0.500
smooth 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.025 0.065 0.260 0.166 0.777 0.119 0.146
10 DAYS wind 0.961 1.000 0.944 0.301 0.382 0.578 0.500 0.500 0.663 0.500
smooth 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.217 0.117 0.578 0.500 0.500 0.119 0.146
20 DAYS wind 0.942 1.000 0.935 0.122 0.163 0.500 0.337 0.616 0.642 0.698
smooth 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.878 0.578 0.789 0.663 0.807 0.358 0.302
30 DAYS wind 0.859 1.000 0.905 0.102 0.133 0.500 0.312 0.500 0.500 0.500
smooth 1.000 0.998 1.000 0.820 0.938 0.985 0.969 0.934 0.500 0.500
Croatia 2001– 2006
2 DAYS wind 0.853 1.000 0.855 0.437 0.260 0.287 0.193 0.500 0.250
smooth 0.983 0.999 1.000 0.437 0.013 0.135 0.384 0.854 0.750
5 DAYS wind 0.600 1.000 0.911 0.084 0.125 0.108 0.210 0.500 0.698
smooth 0.999 0.997 1.000 0.780 0.030 0.400 0.210 0.942 0.302
10 DAYS wind 0.762 0.983 0.798 0.007 0.095 0.179 0.312 0.500 0.698
smooth 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.569 0.009 0.678 0.500 0.777 0.302
20 DAYS wind 0.775 0.981 0.837 0.016 0.038 0.121 0.121 0.358 0.500
smooth 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.921 0.322 0.879 0.594 0.853 0.500
30 DAYS wind 0.500 0.938 0.750 0.008 0.020 0.080 0.080 0.271 0.337 0.250
smooth 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.879 0.865 0.997 0.971 0.957 0.663 0.102
Czech Republic
2 DAYS wind 0.956 0.500 0.125 0.775 0.080 0.373 0.223 0.337 0.500 0.750 0.750
smooth 0.993 0.997 1.000 0.108 0.384 0.627 0.223 0.013 0.008 0.045 0.045
5 DAYS wind 0.834 0.415 0.062 0.500 0.301 0.616 0.147 0.337 0.500 0.750 0.750
smooth 0.996 0.999 1.000 0.500 0.009 0.080 0.358 0.013 0.008 0.045 0.045
10 DAYS wind 0.775 0.330 0.038 0.600 0.301 0.616 0.147 0.337 0.500 0.750 0.750
smooth 0.994 0.999 1.000 0.400 0.009 0.080 0.358 0.013 0.008 0.045 0.045
20/30 DAYS wind 0.790 0.238 0.045 0.500 0.384 0.500 0.172 0.358 0.337 0.500 0.500
smooth 0.987 0.997 0.999 0.500 0.010 0.271 0.172 0.006 0.013 0.026 0.026
Hungary
Single event W W W W W W W W W
Romania
2/5 DAYS wind 0.698 0.923 0.337 0.962 0.909 0.750
smooth 0.909 0.777 0.962 0.663 0.909 0.750
10 DAYS wind 0.698 0.881 0.500 0.813 0.813 0.500
smooth 0.909 0.663 0.942 0.942 0.942 0.854
20/30 DAYS wind 0.250 0.500 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250
smooth 0.750 0.146 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.750
Slovakia
2 DAYS wind 0.848 0.582 0.731 0.688 0.022 0.058 0.058 0.032 0.302
smooth 0.991 0.984 1.000 0.500 0.993 0.500 0.942 0.909 0.302
5 DAYS wind 0.934 0.762 0.594 0.594 0.080 0.119 0.119 0.020 0.187 0.250 0.102
smooth 0.934 0.238 1.000 0.594 0.807 0.119 0.663 0.942 0.500 0.750 0.750
10 DAYS wind 0.963 0.600 0.600 0.400 0.094 0.077 0.077 0.013 0.119 0.146 0.053
smooth 0.906 0.400 0.999 0.775 0.906 0.223 0.777 0.962 0.663 0.854 0.854
20/30 DAYS wind 0.957 0.384 0.616 0.193 0.007 0.065 0.022 0.017 0.147 0.187 0.187
smooth 0.995 0.971 0.997 0.080 0.935 0.172 0.935 0.853 0.358 0.500 0.058
Turkey – discretionary interventions
2 DAYS wind 0.762 0.238 0.879 0.600 0.729 0.500 0.119 0.032 0.091
smooth 0.978 1.000 0.008 0.400 0.271 0.729 0.663 0.909 0.302
5 DAYS wind 0.688 0.312 0.834 0.688 0.729 0.500 0.119 0.032 0.091
smooth 0.996 0.999 0.031 0.166 0.271 0.729 0.663 0.909 0.302
10 DAYS wind 0.250 0.600 0.400 0.775 0.775 0.616 0.384 0.077 0.032 0.091
smooth 0.750 0.994 0.999 0.017 0.108 0.384 0.807 0.777 0.909 0.302
20 DAYS wind 0.250 0.699 0.301 0.500 0.699 0.713 0.500 0.077 0.032 0.091
smooth 0.750 0.991 0.999 0.066 0.301 0.135 0.500 0.777 0.909 0.302
30 DAYS wind 0.500 0.713 0.287 0.500 0.713 0.500 0.271 0.033 0.020 0.058 0.102
smooth 0.854 0.865 0.998 0.135 0.500 0.271 0.729 0.902 0.942 0.500 0.750
Turkey – discretionary & auction-based interventions
2 DAYS wind 0.172 0.301 0.934 0.172 0.013 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250
smooth 0.993 0.934 0.999 0.172 0.962 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.750
5 DAYS wind 0.119 0.373 0.627 0.172 0.013 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250
smooth 0.962 0.935 0.993 0.627 0.962 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.750
10/20/30 DAYS wind 0.187 0.250 0.500 0.098 0.025 0.146 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250
smooth 0.942 0.500 0.989 0.500 0.975 0.146 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.750
Notes: see Table B1.
46Table B7. FX interventions ￿ the combined effect: direction matters; weakening
NONPARAMETRIC SIGN TEST – p-values
PRE- AND POST-EVENT WINDOW
EVENT W 1 2 5 10 15 20 30 40 50 60
Croatia – 1996–2005
2 DAYS wind 0.990 1.000 0.017 0.888 0.337 0.384 0.271 0.500 0.250
smooth 0.971 1.000 1.000 0.935 0.663 0.384 0.729 0.854 0.750
5 DAYS wind 0.590 1.000 0.048 0.721 0.133 0.152 0.287 0.500 0.698 0.250
smooth 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.615 0.772 0.699 0.500 0.942 0.302 0.102
10 DAYS wind 0.856 0.999 0.033 0.312 0.141 0.322 0.500 0.500 0.698 0.250
smooth 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.312 0.641 0.913 0.834 0.777 0.302 0.102
20 DAYS wind 0.821 1.000 0.172 0.116 0.133 0.500 0.406 0.750 0.813 0.500
smooth 0.998 0.994 1.000 0.989 0.750 0.913 0.879 0.902 0.500 0.146
30 DAYS wind 0.688 0.998 0.107 0.133 0.152 0.607 0.500 0.729 0.663 0.302
smooth 0.996 0.970 1.000 0.938 0.934 0.987 0.980 0.957 0.663 0.302
Croatia – 2001–2006
2 DAYS wind 0.881 1.000 0.079 0.578 0.152 0.250 0.250 0.750
smooth 0.962 0.998 1.000 0.958 0.301 0.500 0.500 0.750
5 DAYS wind 0.616 0.999 0.180 0.133 0.062 0.080 0.271 0.698 0.854
smooth 0.997 0.989 1.000 0.984 0.410 0.807 0.271 0.909 0.146
10 DAYS wind 0.865 0.984 0.079 0.022 0.062 0.152 0.393 0.663 0.854
smooth 0.998 0.998 1.000 0.663 0.133 0.934 0.607 0.663 0.146
20 DAYS wind 0.500 0.978 0.238 0.031 0.066 0.210 0.210 0.663 0.854
smooth 0.995 0.997 1.000 0.969 0.301 0.906 0.607 0.663 0.146
30 DAYS wind 0.250 0.865 0.135 0.029 0.065 0.250 0.250 0.642 0.698 0.250
smooth 0.989 0.980 0.998 0.807 0.627 0.989 0.902 0.853 0.302 0.102
Czech Republic
2 DAYS wind 0.969 0.418 0.022 0.865 0.098 0.358 0.119 0.337 0.500 0.750 0.750
smooth 0.969 0.984 1.000 0.020 0.098 0.358 0.119 0.013 0.008 0.045 0.045
5 DAYS wind 0.865 0.312 0.006 0.607 0.384 0.627 0.077 0.337 0.500 0.750 0.750
smooth 0.980 0.996 0.999 0.210 0.001 0.022 0.223 0.013 0.008 0.045 0.045
10 DAYS wind 0.807 0.225 0.003 0.713 0.384 0.627 0.077 0.337 0.500 0.750 0.750
smooth 0.971 0.994 0.999 0.135 0.001 0.022 0.223 0.013 0.008 0.045 0.045
20/30 DAYS wind 0.883 0.210 0.007 0.500 0.373 0.373 0.098 0.358 0.337 0.500 0.500
smooth 0.957 0.987 0.998 0.271 0.003 0.172 0.098 0.006 0.013 0.026 0.026
Slovakia
2 DAYS wind 0.729 0.500 0.066 0.935 0.077 0.250 0.102 0.102 0.250
smooth 0.957 0.699 0.999 0.022 0.975 0.102 0.750 0.750 0.102
5 DAYS wind 0.883 0.883 0.043 0.957 0.147 0.250 0.102 0.102 0.250
smooth 0.729 0.005 0.995 0.043 0.853 0.102 0.750 0.750 0.102
10 DAYS wind 0.935 0.828 0.065 0.935 0.250 0.250 0.102 0.102 0.250
smooth 0.627 0.022 0.993 0.172 0.902 0.102 0.750 0.750 0.102
20/30 DAYS wind 0.923 0.663 0.038 0.881 0.020 0.187 0.020 0.091 0.302 0.250 0.750
smooth 0.975 0.663 0.962 0.002 0.942 0.058 0.942 0.302 0.032 0.102 0.045
Turkey – discretionary interventions
2 DAYS wind 0.848 0.066 0.848 0.713 0.750 0.750 0.302 0.102 0.102
smooth 0.934 0.999 0.066 0.135 0.500 0.500 0.302 0.750 0.750
5 DAYS wind 0.790 0.094 0.790 0.790 0.750 0.750 0.302 0.102 0.102
smooth 0.987 0.998 0.210 0.037 0.500 0.500 0.302 0.750 0.750
10 DAYS wind 0.250 0.713 0.135 0.713 0.865 0.627 0.627 0.187 0.102 0.102
smooth 0.750 0.980 0.998 0.135 0.020 0.627 0.627 0.500 0.750 0.750
20 DAYS wind 0.250 0.807 0.080 0.384 0.807 0.729 0.729 0.187 0.102 0.102
smooth 0.750 0.971 0.997 0.384 0.080 0.271 0.271 0.500 0.750 0.750
30 DAYS wind 0.500 0.828 0.065 0.373 0.828 0.500 0.500 0.077 0.053 0.053
smooth 0.854 0.627 0.993 0.627 0.172 0.500 0.500 0.777 0.854 0.854
Turkey – discretionary & auction-based interventions
2 DAYS wind 0.663 0.500 0.223 0.058 0.032 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250
smooth 0.962 0.777 0.975 0.942 0.909 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.750
5 DAYS wind 0.302 0.187 0.058 0.058 0.032 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250
smooth 0.909 0.500 0.942 0.942 0.909 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.750
10/20/30 DAYS wind 0.302 0.187 0.058 0.058 0.032 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250
smooth 0.909 0.500 0.942 0.942 0.909 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.750
Notes: see Table B1. Results for Romania are not reported because success could not be identi￿ed for any of the event
and pre- and post-event window de￿nitions.
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NONPARAMETRIC SIGN TEST – p-values
PRE- AND POST-EVENT WINDOW
W 1 2 5 10 15 20 30 40 50 60
Croatia 2001–2006
event 2 wind 0.250 0.969 0.999 0.210 0.500 0.302 0.146
smooth 0.500 0.431 0.500 0.338 0.294 0.326 0.385
event 5 wind 0.302 0.906 0.998 0.135 0.500 0.302 0.146
smooth 0.500 0.444 0.500 0.354 0.294 0.326 0.385
event 10 wind 0.187 0.616 0.997 0.043 0.358 0.302 0.146
smooth 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.395 0.316 0.326 0.385
event 20 wind 0.813 0.642 0.983 0.077 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.102 0.102
smooth 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.392 0.409 0.409 0.409 0.500 0.500
event 30 wind 0.663 0.777 0.975 0.038 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.102
smooth 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.437 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
Slovakia 2001–2006
event 2 wind 0.698 0.500 0.989 0.077 0.053 0.053 0.146 0.102 0.250
smooth 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
event 5 wind 0.698 0.223 0.975 0.025 0.091 0.091 0.302 0.053 0.146 0.250 0.102
smooth 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.409 0.409 0.409 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
event 10 wind 0.698 0.119 0.962 0.013 0.058 0.058 0.187 0.032 0.091 0.146 0.053
smooth 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.426 0.426 0.426 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
event 20/30 wind 0.698 0.119 0.962 0.013 0.058 0.058 0.187 0.032 0.091 0.146 0.053
smooth 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.426 0.426 0.426 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
Notes: see Table B1. Results for the remaining countries are not reported because success could not be identi￿ed for any of the event and
pre- and post-event window de￿nitions.
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